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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
William Rekow ("Rekow") appeals the District Court's decision granting summary 
judgment to Defendant/Respondent Ronald Weekes ("Weekes") on the basis that Rekow' s 
damages were limited to the period after he served written notice of defects related to the 
property Rekow was renting from Weekes pursuant to Idaho Code §6-320.1 Rekow further 
appeals the dismissal of his claims for specific performance, breach of an implied warranty of 
habitability and conversion, as well as the denial of his motion to reconsider the District Court's 
summary judgment decision granting Weekes' motion for summary judgment. 2 Although it is 
difficult to determine from Rekow's filings on appeal precisely how he believes the District 
Court erred,3 his arguments can be distilled to essentially two components: (1) the District Court 
erred as a matter of law in holding that Idaho Code §6-320 limited his damages to the time 
period after he served written notice of defects; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed on 
his remaining claims for conversion, breach of an implied warranty of habitability and specific 
performance that precluded summary judgment in favor of Weekes. Aside from failing to 
provide any supporting citations to the record or legal authority for these arguments, Rekow's 
arguments are simply incorrect. 
A. Course of Proceedings 
Rekow filed his Complaint under Idaho Code §6-320 seeking over $74,000 in damages 
from Weekes for alleged defects to property in the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
1 R. pp. 44-46, 49-53. 
2 Id. 
3 As discussed below, Rekow' s two page brief on appeal fails to provide any factual or legal support for the issues 
raised in his Notice of Appeal and First Amended Notice of Appeal. 
Magistrate Division, on October 10, 2012.4 Weekes filed his Answer on November 2, 2012.5 
Due to the amount of damages requested, the case was transferred to the District Court by order 
entered January 7, 2013. 6 Weekes filed a motion to dismiss with a supporting memorandum and 
affidavits on February 10, 2014, seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against him in the 
Complaint.7 Weekes' motion was based on several theories, four of which are relevant here: (1) 
breach of an implied warranty of habitability claim has been subsumed by statute, namely Idaho 
Code §6-320; (2) Rekow's claims are moot because the house had been razed and repairs were 
therefore impossible; (3) Rekow's damages should be limited by the doctrines of unclean hands, 
laches and waiver due to his lengthy delay in requesting repair of defects in writing; and (4) to 
the extent a claim for conversion was pled, there is no disputed issue of fact showing that 
Weekes improperly possessed the items alleged.8 Rekow filed responsive affidavits and a 
memorandum in opposition. 9 The Court heard arguments on the motion for summary judgment 
on March 18, 2014. 
4 R. pp. 6-27. 
5 R. pp. 28-36. 
6 R. Vol. 1, p. 8 (Weekes requested supplementation of the record on appeal, which supplemental record is identified 
as Volume 1 and Volume 2; the original record will be referred to without reference to a volume). 
7 R. Vol. 1, pp. 23-133. Due to the timing of the Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial Conference ("Scheduling 
Order") in relation to the time frames set forth therein for filing of dispositive motions, Weekes filed a separate 
motion to amend the Scheduling Order and requested that his motion to dismiss be considered an alternative motion 
for summary judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 8 (noting the February 5, 2014 Motion to Amend Order Setting Case for Trial 
and Pretrial Conference); R. Vol. I, p. 23, fn. 1. The District Court heard the motion to dismiss as one for summary 
judgment on March 18, 2014. Tr. p. 18, LL 4-16. (The transcript of the March 18, 2014 summary judgment hearing 
will be referred to without reference to volume; the transcript of the May 23, 2014 trial will be referred to as Tr., 
Vol. 2). 
8 R Vol. 1, pp. 26-42. 
9 R. Vol. 1, pp. 142-144 (Affidavit of Kathy Thomas), 145-202 (Rekow's Reply Affidavit in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss), 211-239 (Rekow's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment). Rekow's affidavit in response to Weekes' motion for judicial notice included a request to 
amend the Complaint to add claims against Weekes that was never properly noticed for hearing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 13 7-
141. 
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At the end of the hearing on Weekes' motion for summary judgment, the District Court 
announced its decision on the motion. 10 The District Court noted that Rekow was claiming 
damages for 55 months of tenancy, but found that he had not provided written notice of such 
defects until September 14, 2012, and found that with respect to the time period after September 
14, 2012, there was some dispute as to the amount of damages. 11 The District Court agreed with 
Weekes' argument that an implied warranty of habitability claim has been subsumed by Idaho 
Code §6-320, as discussed in Worden v. Ord1vay, 105 Idaho 719, 672 P.2d 1049 (1983), and 
therefore dismissed that claim.12 With respect to Rekow's request for damages for repairs to the 
property/specific performance, the District Court found no disputed issue of fact that the house 
had been tom down and therefore those claims were moot. 13 The District Court also found that 
there was no disputed issue of fact that the items alleged to have been in Weekes' possession in 
the Complaint had been returned to Rekow, making the conversion claim moot 14 The court 
entered a written Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment on March 28, 2014, consistent with its oral decision.'5 
Rekow filed a motion to reconsider the District Court's summary judgment order on 
March 25, 2014. 16 The District Court entered its order denying the motion to reconsider on April 
10 See generally, Tr. pp. 18-21. 
11 Tr. p. 20, LL 2-11. 
12 Tr.p.18,L20-p.19,L2. 
13 Tr. p. 19, L 18 - p. 20, L 1. 
14 Tr. p. 21, LL 2-6. The District Court further agreed with Weekes that it was not plainly apparent from the face of 
the Complaint that a claim for conversion had been properly pled. To the extent it was, Rekow admitted the items 
alleged to have been converted had been returned, making such a claim moot. Tr. p. 20, L 18 -p. 21, L 5. 
15 R. pp. 37-40. 
16 R. Vol. 1, p. 9 (docket sheet showing filing ofRekow's motion to reconsider and an affidavit and memorandum in 
support on March 25, 2014). The motion to reconsider, the memorandum and affidavit in support, and the District 
Court's order denying the motion, are not part of the record on appeal. 
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1, 2014. 17 On March 28, 2014, Rekow filed a motion to amend his Complaint to add a party and 
add claims. 18 That motion was denied on April 28, 2014. 19 
The issue of Rekow's damages after September 14, 2012 went to court trial on May 23, 
2014.20 At the close of Rekow's case, Weekes moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 
50(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.21 The District Court granted the motion on two 
grounds.22 First, it held that the written notice of defects dated September 14, 2012 had never 
been admitted into evidence during the trial, which was a necessity under Idaho Code §6-320.23 
Second, the District Court held that Rekow had failed to provide any quantification of 
damages.24 A written Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict was entered June 
3, 2014, which noted that the court was treating the motion as one for involuntary dismissal 
under Rule 41(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.25 After the court granted Weekes' 
motion for attorney fees and costs, the District Court entered its Final Judgment on July 29, 
2014.26 
Rekow filed his Notice of Appeal June 23, 2014, identifying two issues on appeal: (1) 
limitation of damages to the period after September 14, 2012; and (2) denial of the motion to 
17 R. Vol. 1, p. 10. 
18 R. Vol. 1, p. 9. 
19 R. Vol. 1, pp. 9-10. The denial of the motion to amend is not identified by Rekow as an issue on appeal, and the 
motion, affidavits and memorandums in support thereof and in opposition thereto are not part of the record on 
appeal. 
20 See generally, Tr. Vol. 2. 
21 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 102, LL 3-8. 
22 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 103, L 16 - p. 104, L 22. 
23 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 104, LL 1-7. 
24 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 104, LL 8-15. 
25 R. pp. 41-43. The District Court's order is not identified as an issue on appeal. 
26 R. pp. 54-55. The District Court awarded Weekes $17,500 in attorney fees and $66.00 in costs on July 29, 2014. 
Rekow has not appealed the award of attorney fees. 
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reconsider.27 This Court issued its Order Conditionally Dismissing the Appeal on July 7, 2014, 
due to Rekow's failure to pay for the preparation of the Clerk's Record and the Reporter's 
Transcript and failure to comply with I.A.R. 17. Thereafter, on July 29, 2014, Rekow filed his 
First Amended Notice of Appeal, which included three new issues on appeal, but failed to 
include as an issue on appeal the denial of his motion to reconsider. 28 The three additional issues 
raised by the First Amended Notice of Appeal are: (1) the District Court's denial of Rekow's 
request for specific performance; (2) the District Court's denial of Rekow's claim for breach of 
an implied warranty of habitability; and (3) the District Court's denial of Rekow's claim for 
conversion. 29 
B. Statement of Facts 
Weekes owns certain property located in Gem County, Idaho, to wit: 9449 Brill Road, 
Emmett, Idaho. 30 Rekow began living at the property with a former employee of Weekes in 
approximately the winter of 2007. 31 After the former employee's employment ended and he had 
vacated the property, Rekow asked Weekes if he could continue to live at the house. 32 In early 
June 2008, Weekes and Rekow verbally agreed that Rekow could reside at the house for $200 
per month plus the cost of electricity. 33 The house was over 100 years old at the time Rekow 
began living there and was in need of some repair; in fact, Weekes and his father had considered 
27 R. pp. 44-46. The Notice of Appeal includes reference to factual issues which apparently Rekow suggests support 
one or both issues raised on appeal. 
28 R. pp. 49-53. 
29 Jd. 
30 R. Vol. 1, p. 125, 12. 
31 Id. at 13; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 31, L 18 - p. 32, L 8. 
32 R. Vol. 1, p. 125, 13; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 32, LL 9-23. 
33 R. Vol. 1, p. 125, 13; see also, R. Vol. 1, p. 51 (p. 10, L 4 - p. 11, L 8 and p. 11, LL 14-18 of the transcript). 
Weekes gave Rekow employment and considered his use of the house as part of his employment. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 32, 
LL 20-25. 
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tearing the house down even before Rekow's tenancy began. 34 However, the house did have 
heat, electricity and running water.35 For his part, Rekow accepted the house in its "as-is" 
condition when his tenancy began. 36 
The relationship between Weekes and Rekow was strained at best. Weekes had given 
Rekow employment and a place to live when he had nowhere else to go. 37 Yet, Rekow 
complained incessantly about both his employment and the house. 38 The years of strained 
relations came to a head in July 2012, when Weekes terminated Rekow's employment. 39 Shortly 
thereafter, Weekes served Rekow with a notice of increase in rent on September 12, 2012.40 Just 
two days later, on September 14, 2012, Rekow served Weekes with a lengthy list of defects and 
requested repairs be made "in accordance with Idaho Code."41 On September 21, 2014, Rekow 
served a letter on Weekes' attorney requesting four items allegedly in Weekes' possession be 
returned to Rekow.42 Rekow failed to pay any rent after September 2012.43 Thus, in January 
2013, Weekes filed a complaint in the magistrate court for unlawful detainer and the magistrate 
court subsequently entered an order evicting Rekow for failure to pay rent and returning 
possession of the property to Weekes.44 The house was subsequently tom down by Weekes.45 
34 R. Vol. 1, p. 126, i]i]2 and 4; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 47, LI - p. 48, L 16. 
35 R. Vol. 1, p. 126, i]4. 
36 Id. at i]5; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 30, L 25 - p. 31, L 13, p. 53, LL 1-16, p. 74, L 23 -p. 75, L 13. 
37 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 32, LL 5-8. 
38 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 34, LL 7-22, p. 37, LL 19-23. 
39 R. Vol. 1, p. 53 (unlawful detainer transcript, p. 20, LL 2-3). 
40 R. p. 12 (Exhibit A to Complaint). 
41 Id. at p. 14. 
42 Id. at p. 17. The letter, attached as Exhibit C to the Complaint, specifically requested return of four items: (1) a 
large chassis grease gun assembly and its wheel carriage; (2) a rock drill; (3) a receiver for a trailer hitch sans ball; 
and (4) an adaptor fitting assembly for an air compressor. R. p. 17. The items were returned to Rekow in early 
2014, as admitted by Rekow during the summary judgment proceedings. R. Vol. 2, p. 220; Tr. p. 15, L 19 - p. 16, L 
4. 
43 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 74, LL 2-19; R. Vol. 1, p. 162 (transcript of unlawful detainer proceeding, p. 20, LL 14-20). 
44 R. Vol. 1, p. 55 (transcript at p. 25, LL 14-17), pp. 64-70. 
45 R. Vol. 1, p. 127, ~8; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 67, LL 10-17. 
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Rekow's Complaint sought over $74,000 in damages from Weekes for defects to the 
property that Rekow alleged had existed virtually from the moment he moved in over five (5) 
years prior to the filing of the Complaint.46 While Rekow alleged he made "hundreds" of verbal 
requests for repairs to the property over the course of his five-year tenancy, he did not file 
written notice of any such alleged defects until September 14, 2012-after Weekes served a 
notice of increase in rent.47 Essentially, Rekow sought a windfall for over five years' worth of 
alleged defects for which he had never provided written notice.48 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether Weekes is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§6-324 or 
12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 11.2( a), 40 and 41? 
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Weekes seeks attorney fees and costs in defending this action on appeal in accordance 
with Idaho Code §§6-324 and 12-121, and Idaho Appellate Rules l 1.2(a), 40 and 41 for the 
reasons that (1) should Weekes prevail, Idaho Code §6-324 provides for a mandatory award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party and (2) Rekow has brought this appeal unreasonably and 
without foundation. 
46 R. pp. 6-27 (see, in particular, p. 10, ,i,i (ii) - (v) and Exhibit B to the Complaint). 
47 R. Vol. 1, p. 116; R. pp. 14-16 (Exhibit B to the Complaint). 
48 Rekow admitted during the course of both the unlawful detainer action and the District Court action that 
Weekes had attempted to make some repairs over the course of Rekow's tenancy. R. Vol. 1, p. 162 





As set forth in Section I(A) above, Rekow's initial Notice of Appeal included only two 
issues: (1) limitation of damages to the period after September 14, 2012; and (2) denial of the 
motion to reconsider. After this Court issued its conditional order of dismissal for Rekow' s 
failure to pay for the preparation of the record and otherwise comply with the requirements of 
I.AR. 17, Rekow filed an amended notice of appeal on July 29, 2014, which included three new 
issues on appeal not previously raised. The issues raised the amended notice of appeal are 
untimely and should not be considered by this Court. 
Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules governs time filing appeals from the 
District Court. It provides that an appeal may be made "only by physically filing a notice of 
appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing 
stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or order the district court appealable as a 
matter of right .... "49 Rule 17(m) of the Idaho Appellate Rules allows a party to file an amended 
notice of appeal to correctly set forth facts and information erroneously set forth the original 
notice of appeal. The rule also permits a party to amend an appeal where new facts arise after 
the original appeal was filed. 50 If the original notice of appeal was timely filed, the amended 
notice of appeal will relate back to the date of filing of the original notice of appeal. 51 
49 I.AR. 14(a). 
so I.AR. 17(m). 
s1 Id. 
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The District Court's order granting Weekes' motion for directed verdict was entered June 
3, 2014. 52 Therefore, Rekow's notice of appeal was required to be filed no later than July 15, 
2014. Weekes does not dispute that Rekow's original notice of appeal was timely filed. 
However, the three additional issues raised by the amended notice of appea153 were untimely 
because they were raised for the first time after the time for filing an appeal on those issues had 
expired. The relation back permitted in I.AR. l 7(m) does not permit a party to raise new issues 
for the first time in an amended notice unless new facts arise after the filing of the original notice 
of appeal. 54 Here, no new facts were discovered that prompted Rekow to file an amended notice 
of appeal. Rather, it was his failure to follow well-established appellate rules that necessitated 
the amended notice of appeal after this Court conditionally dismissed the appeal. The issues 
relating to the District Court's dismissal of Rekow's specific performance, conversion and 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim were waived when Rekow failed to include 
them in his original notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Court should decline to consider them. 
B. Rekow Has Waived Issues Relating to the Dismissal of His Claims For Damages, 
Specific Performance, Implied Warranty of Habitability and Conversion by Failing 
to Comply With I.A.R. 35(a)(6). 
In Rekow's two-page brief on appeal, he only refers marginally to the District Court's 
limitation of damages and denial of damages in lieu of specific performance; no reference is 
made at all to dismissal of the claims for breach of an implied warranty of habitability and 
conversion. Rule 35(a)(6) of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that the appellant's brief "shall 
contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
52 R. pp. 41-43. 
53 Those three issues are the District Court's dismissal ofRekow's claims for: (1) specific performance; (2) breach 
of an implied warranty of habitability; and (3) conversion. R. pp. 49-53. 
54 I.AR. 17(m). 
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reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record 
relied upon."55 As reiterated by the Court in Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 
248, 257 (2012), the Court will "not consider assignments of error not suppmied by argument 
and authority in the opening brief. "56 "A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority 
or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking."57 Additionally, the Court will not search the 
record for error; rather, it is the party alleging error that has the burden of showing it in the 
record. 58 Because Rekow has failed to comply with the appellate rules as set forth above, he has 
waived issues relating to breach of the implied warranty of habitability and conversion. 
In Bolognese, this Court held the appellant buyers waived the issue of whether the trial 
court erred in denying their motion for a new trial where the buyers failed to cite to the record for 
many facts and provided neither argument nor authority as to why any of the alleged facts would 
constitute grounds for a new trial or why the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant 
the motion. 59 On the damages issues raised here, Rekow fails to cite to the record for many of 
the alleged facts and there is little argument and no supporting authority as to how the District 
Court erred. Accordingly, Rekow has waived issues relating to limitation of damages and 
dismissal of his claim for specific performance. 
C. The District Court Correctly Limited Rekow's Damages to the Period After 
September 14, 2012-the Date of Service of Notice of Defects. 
The primary substantive argument submitted by Rekow on appeal is whether the District 
Court erred in granting Weekes' motion for summary judgment limiting Rekow's damages to the 
55 I.A.R. 35(a)(6). 
56 Id. (citing Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). 
57 Id. (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
58 Id. 
59 153 Idaho at 867, 292 P.3d at 258. 
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time period after he served written notice of defects pursuant to Idaho Code §6-320. On appeal, 
Rekow argues that the District Court erred by linking the standing requirement of Idaho Code 
§6-320 to the amount of damages a tenant may recover under the statute. As urged by Rekow, 
"Nowhere in [the statute] does it specify, indicate or even intimate that a tenant has no damages 
before achieving standing to file."60 Rekow's argument misconstrues the District Court's 
findings. 
1. Standard of Review 
"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion."61 Summary judgment 
is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."62 "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are to be drawn in favor of the nomnoving party."63 When an action will be tried before the 
court without a jury, the trial court is entitled to anive at the most probable inferences based 
upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences. 64 "This Court exercises free review over the entire record 
that was before the district judge to determine whether either side was entitled to summary 
judgment and reviews the inferences drawn by the district judge to determine whether the record 
60 Appellant's Brief, p. 1. 
61 Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 73, 233 P.3d 1, 4 (2008) (citing Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 
236, 48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002)). 
62 Id. (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). 
63 Jesse, 149 Idaho at 73,233 P.3d at 4. 
64 Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 90, 233 P.3d 18, 21 (2008) (citing P.O. 
Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). 
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reasonably supports those inferences." 65 On appeal, Rekow does not dispute the pertinent facts; 
therefore, only a question oflaw remains for this Court's consideration. 
2. The District Court Proper(r Limited Rekow's Damages. 
Idaho Code §6-320(d) provides that before "a tenant shall have standing to file an action 
under this section, he must give his landlord three (3) days written notice, listing each failure or 
breach upon which his action will be premised and written demand requiring performance or 
cure." If the landlord fails to perform or cure the alleged defects within three days after service 
of the written notice, the tenant may then proceed to commence an action for damages or specific 
perfonnance. 66 Thus, in order to recover damages or obtain specific performance, the tenant 
must show (1) that he complied with the three-day written notice requirement; and (2) that the 
landlord failed to remedy the defects alleged in the notice within the three-day period. 67 "The 
purpose of the requirement of 'three (3) days written notice' is to notify the landlord of a claimed 
failure or breach and to give him three days within which to remedy it."68 
It is undisputed that Rekow's tenancy began in early June 2008. It is also undisputed that 
Rekow did not serve a written notice of defects on Weekes until September 14, 2012. On appeal, 
Weekes does not dispute that Rekow had standing under Idaho Code §6-320(d) to file the lawsuit 
after September 17, 2012.69 However, standing to file the lawsuit and the measure of damages 
recoverable once standing is established are two separate issues. The damages recoverable under 
Idaho Code §6-320 are those recoverable for breach of contract. 70 Damages recoverable for 
65 Id. 
66 Idaho Code §6-320(d). 
67 Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 884, 42 P.3d 672, 677 (2002). 
68 Id. 
69 Weekes also did not dispute this point on summary judgment. 
70 Silver Creek Computers, 136 Idaho at 884, 42 P.3d at 677. 
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breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the breach and are reasonably foreseeable. 71 
Damages need not have been precisely and specifically foreseeable, but only such as were 
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time they contracted. 72 Consequential damages are 
not recoverable unless specifically within the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
contracting. 73 
Rekow sought over $23,650 in loss of value damages-calculated at $430 per month for 
55 months of tenancy-and $42,325 in actual treble damages. 74 Weekes did not produce any 
evidence, either on summary judgment or at trial, supporting the loss of value damages, or any 
other damages, for that matter. 75 Even if Rekow had provided some evidence of how those 
alleged damages were calculated, he failed to show that such damages were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time his tenancy began. Rather, the evidence clearly showed that Rekow was 
fully aware of the condition of the home at the time his tenancy began, that Weekes attempted at 
various times over the course of the tenancy to repair the water issues, and that many of the 
alleged deficiencies existing as of September 2012 were of Rekow's own making. Based on 
these facts, the District Court properly determined that damages predating the September 14, 
2012 written notice of defects were not foreseeable and therefore not recoverable by Rekow. 
On summary judgment, Weekes argued that Rekow's damages should be limited based 
upon the equitable doctrines of estoppel, unclean hands and waiver. The District Court also 
71 Id. (citing Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 R. p. 10, ~~(ii) and (v). 
75 Weekes asked Rekow in discovery to explain his calculation, to which Rekow responded "there exists no 
'method' for determining loss of value" and then vaguely referenced a pamphlet issued by the Idaho Attorney 
General's Office. R. Vol. I, p. 112 (response to Interrogatory No. 11 ). At trial, the District Court specifically found 
that Rekow had failed to provide any "quantification of any kind of damages." Tr. Vol. 2, p. I 04, LL 8-10. 
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properly limited Rekow's damages under those theories. The doctrine of laches is an equitable 
doctrine that arose at a time when there were no statutes of limitation applicable to equity 
claims.76 Early equity courts adopted analogous legal limitations as a rough guide, which 
presumptively disallowed claims brought beyond the analogous legal limitation period.77 To 
invoke the defense of laches, Idaho requires the following elements to be proven: (1) defendant's 
invasion of plaintiff's rights, (2) delay in asserting plaintiff's rights, the plaintiff having had 
notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge by defendant that plaintiff 
would assert his rights, and (4) injury or prejudice to defendant. 78 
The doctrine of "unclean hands" allows a "court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on 
the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and dishonest, or fraudulent and 
deceitful as to the controversy at issue."79 A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment 
of a known right and "the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable 
reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment."80 
Assuming, arguendo, that Weekes invaded Rekow's rights by not fixing any of the 
numerous defects in the property alleged in the Complaint, it is clear that Weekes had no 
knowledge that Rekow would assert his rights under Idaho Code §6-320 after living at the 
property for nearly five years (55 months, as alleged in the Complaint), particularly when Rekow 
was aware of and agreed to the age and condition of the house at the time he and Weekes made 
their verbal rental agreement Clearly, Rekow was aware of his rights under the statute because 
he asserted such rights after he received a notice of increase in rent from Weekes. 
76 Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252,259, 706 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Ct. App. 1985). 
77 Id. 
78 Landis, 109 Idaho at 259, 706 P.2d at 1370. 
79 Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 92 P.3d 492, 501 (2004). 
8° Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291,295 (2006). 
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Rekow failed to take timely action to redress what he perceived as inadequate and unsafe 
living conditions when he knew the statutory prerequisites to filing a claim. He was allowed to 
live at the house for nearly five years at a very low rental rate of $200 per month plus electricity. 
In all that time, Rekow failed to make any written complaints requesting repairs of what he now 
considers unsafe and unlivable conditions.81 Only after the relationship between the parties 
deteriorated and Rekow's employment was terminated did Rekow make any attempt to comply 
with the requirements ofldaho Code §6-320. At that point, Rekow failed to pay rent not only for 
September but for many more months thereafter during which he continued to be in possession 
of the premises. The District Court clearly recognized these equitable defenses and considered 
them in conjunction with the standing requirements ofldaho Code §6-320(d).82 
D. Even if the Court Considers Rekow's Claims for Breach of the Implied Warranty of 
Habitability, Specific Performance and Conversion, the District Court Correctly 
Entered Summary Judgment on Each of Those Issues. 
As set forth above, the Court should decline to consider any issues raised in either the 
original Notice of Appeal or the First Amended Notice of Appeal due to Rekow's failure to 
provide any argument or authority on those issues. However, in the event the Court considers 
those issues, the District Court correctly entered summary judgment and that decision should 
therefore be affirmed. 
81 Again, Weekes does not dispute that some verbal requests for repairs were made over the course of Rekow's 
tenancy, which he attempted to repair when asked. However, Rekow cannot sit on his hands for five years, all the 
while living in a house which he deemed uninhabitable, and then seek a windfall under the auspices of Idaho Code 
§6-320. 
82 Weekes does not suggest, nor did the District Court, that there can never be a situation where a tenant can recover 
damages for alleged defects occurring before written notice thereof was given. Rather, Weekes' position, implicit in 
the District Court's finding, is that under the undisputed facts of this case, Rekow was not entitled to five years' 
worth of damages. 
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I. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability is Not Cognizable as a Separate 
Claim. 
In addition to his claim under Idaho Code §6-320, Rekow alleged a separate claim for 
breach of an implied warranty of habitability. 83 However, this Court has previously held that 
where the legislature has already acted, the court should refrain from changing or expanding a 
common law rule. 84 In Worden, the plaintiff tenant filed a complaint against the landlord 
alleging, among others, claims for breach of an implied warranty of habitability and violation of 
Idaho Code §6-320.85 In upholding the trial court's directed verdict on the breach of implied 
warranty of habitability claim, this Court noted that the Idaho legislature has acted in this area by 
enacting a statutory version of the implied warranty of habitability theory. 86 Here, the District 
Court relied on Worden and correctly dismissed Rekow's claim for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability. 
2. The Undisputed Facts-Not Challenged on Appeal-Reveal That the House 
Was Razed in January 2014 Making Rekow's Claim for Specific Performance 
Moot. 
Rekow appeals the District Court's decision denying damages "in lieu of specific 
perfom1ance" ostensibly on the ground that early attempted repairs to the water delivery system, 
coupled with a statement of Judge Smith in the unlawful detainer action as to the habitability of 
the house, show that damages existed as early as 2008. 87 Although Rekow refers to two invoices 
denoted as "Defendant's Exhibit No. 204"-which exhibit was never admitted at trial and is not 
part of the record on appeal-Rekow never explains how these invoices support a conclusion 
83 R. p. 9, 1113-15. 
84 Worden v. Ordway, 105 Idaho 719,723,672 P.2d 1049, 1053 (1983). 
ss Id. 
86 Id. at 723, 672 P.2d at 1053. 
87 See Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-2. 
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that the District Court erred in dismissing his claim for specific performance. Further, Rekow's 
argument misconstrues the District Court's decision. 
In its oral decision, the District Court held: 
Also, with regard to the claims that are set forth in one, three, and five, and those 
have to do with repairs, temporary housing during the repair, and damages three 
times the estimate of the repair, given the fact that the house is now destroyed, 
and I 1md that the house is destroyed based upon the affidavits that have 
been filed, I can't grant the relief that's requested there, and so those claims 
are moot. I will dismiss claims one, three and five. 88 
As highlighted, the District Court entered summary judgment on issues relating to specific 
performance because the undisputed facts showed that the house had been tom down January 
2014 and Rekow no longer had legal right to possession of the property.89 Rekow agreed that the 
house was at least partially tom down as of that time but suggested that he was still entitled to 
the specific performance remedy of repairs as well as loss of value damages for the 
"uninhabitable" property.90 Due to these undisputed facts, the District Court correctly held that 
the issue of specific performance was moot. 
Mootness is another sub-category of justiciability. "A case becomes moot when the 
issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 
outcome .... A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination 
88 Tr. p. 19, L. 18 - p. 20, L !(emphasis added). 
89 R. Vol. 1, p. 127, ,is. At the time the house was tom down, Weekes had lawful possession of it due to the 
unlawful detainer proceeding in January 2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 55 (unlawful detainer transcript, p. 25, LL 14-16). 
Rekow did not appeal the magistrate court's decision evicting him from the property. 
90 R. Vol. 1, pp. 149-150. Rekow's affidavit in support of his opposition to the motion for summary judgment stated 
that he had pictures showing the kitchen, bathroom, laundry room and pantry were still standing as of February 
2014. Id. at p. 149. Yet, Rekow did not attach any photos to his affidavit or otherwise submit any factual evidence 
or legal support for his argument that the court could still award specific performance, despite the fact that he was no 
longer in lawful possession of the property. He does not challenge the District Court's factual findings in his two-
page appellate brief 
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will have no practical effect upon the outcome."91 This concept precludes courts from deciding 
cases which are purely hypothetical or advisory. The right or status at issue "may invoke either 
remedial or preventative relief; it may relate to a right that has either been breached or is only yet 
in dispute or a status undisturbed but threatened or endangered; but, in either or any event, it 
must involve actual and existing facts." 92 The elements of a justiciable controversy include the 
following: 
A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is appropriate for 
judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished 
from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; 
from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite 
and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties having adverse 
legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting 
of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts. 93 
"Whether an issue is moot is to be determined at the time of the court's trial or hearing, and not 
at the time of commencing the action."94 
At the time of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Weekes was lawfully in 
possession of the property and the house had been torn down. Rekow did not dispute that the 
house was at least partially torn down. Further, he relied on Judge Smith's statements that the 
house was not inhabitable and not easily repaired as supporting his claim that specific 
performance in the form of repairs to the property should be ordered. It would be 
counterintuitive, as Judge Smith noted, to order repairs to property where the property was better 
off being destroyed. Moreover, Idaho Code §6-320 does not require the court to award both 
91 Goodson v. Nez Perce County Board of County Commissioners, 133 Idaho 851,853,993 P.2d 614,616 (2000). 
92 Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516-17, 681 P.2d 988, 991-92 (1984). 
93 Wylie v. State, Idaho Transportation Board, 151 Idaho 26, 31-32, 252 P .3d 700, 705-706 (2011 ). 
94 Wylie, 151 Idaho at 31, 252 P .3d at 705. 
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specific performance and damages. Rather, Idaho Code §6-320(c) specifically allows the court 
to enter a judgment for specific performance, but does not absolutely require it.95 The District 
Court correctly exercised its discretion and, based upon the undisputed facts, found that specific 
performance was not appropriate. 
3. Rekow's Admission That the Allegedly Converted Items Were Returned 
Renders His Claim For Conversion Moot, As Correctly Determined by the 
District Court. 
As the District Court noted in its oral decision on Weekes' motion for summary 
judgment, the Complaint does not specifically plead a cause of action for conversion, although 
the prayer for relief does request return of the four items of personal property specifically 
referenced in Exhibit C to the Complaint.96 Conversion has been defined as "any distinct act of 
dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial or inconsistent with his 
rights therein, such as a tortious taking of another's chattels, or any wrongful exercise ... over 
another's goods, depriving him of possession, permanently or for an indefinite time."97 To 
sufficiently state a claim for conversion, a complaint must allege ( 1) that the plaintiff is the 
owner and entitled to the possession of property therein described; (2) that defendant converted it 
to his own use; and (3) the value of the property, or that the plaintiff has been damaged in a sum 
named.98 
In his motion for summary judgment on this issue, Weekes argued that a conversion 
claim could not be sustained because Rekow had failed (i) to allege that Weekes took the 
95 Idaho Code §6-320( c) provides: If, upon the trial. .. the finding of the court, be in favor of the plaintiff against the 
defendant, judgment shall be entered for the amount of the damages assessed. Judgment may also be entered 
requiring specific performance for any breach of agreement showing by the evidence, and for costs and 
disbursements. (emphasis added). 
96 Tr. p. 20, L 18-p. 21, L 5. 
97 Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 179-80, 118 P.2d 729, 732-33 (1941). 
98 Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732,742,979 P.2d 605,615 (1999). 
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property or otherwise intended to keep it, and (ii) to assign any value to the property allegedly 
converted. Rekow admitted in correspondence with Weekes' counsel that the chassis grease gun 
and air compressor stub fitting had been returned.99 At the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, Rekow provided the following statement to the District Court on the issue of 
conversion: 
As to the valuation of the property, one, not all the property that I've stated is 
missing. It has been returned. And two, to state a value to the property would 
effectively give them a method by which to buy it in money, and I don't want-I 
want my property back. I don't want money in place of what item in its specific 
case is a remembrance of a dead relative. So, no. I don't see a reason to ascribe a 
value to things that I would like returned to me, so it would give them a method 
by which to offer money in the stead of those items that are missing. 100 
Rekow provided no other evidence to the District Court disputing that the items were in Weekes' 
possession. Where there is no disputed issue of fact that the items had been returned, and 
without any dispute as to any damages arising from the alleged conversion, the District Court 
correctly held that the conversion claim was moot and dismissed the claim. 
V. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Weekes may recover his reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rules 11.2, 40 and 41, and Idaho Code §6-324 or §12-121. Rekow's claims were brought 
pursuant to Idaho Code §6-320. Idaho Code §6-324 provides for a mandatory award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party in any action brought under Title 6, Chapter 3. 101 Should the Court 
affirm the District Court's order limiting Rekow's damages, Weekes, as the prevailing party, is 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
99 R. Vol. l, p. 123. 
100 Tr. p. 15, L 19 - p. 16, L 4 ( emphasis added). 
101 See, e.g., Carter v. Zollinger, 146 Idaho 842, 846, 203 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2009); Action Collection Serv. v. 
Haught, 146 Idaho 300, 193 P.3d 460 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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Alternatively, Weekes is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121, which 
allows the Court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees when it is left with the abiding belief 
that the case was "brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." 102 The 
District Court granted Weekes' motion to dismiss all of the claims asserted in the Complaint 
with the exception of the damages asserted in paragraph (ii) of the Complaint With respect to 
damages, the District Court limited Rekow's damages to the time after he served notice of 
defects on Weekes (after September 14, 2012) and allowed that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, 
Rekow was unable to prove he served notice of defects on Weekes and was further unable to 
establish any damages. Rekow has not appealed the judgment of the District Court involuntarily 
dismissing Rekow's damages claim at trial, so that issue is waived. Rekow likewise did not 
appeal the District Court's denial of his motion for reconsideration related to (1) his motion to 
amend the Complaint and (2) the Court's order granting in part and denying in part Weekes' 
motion to dismiss/for summary judgment. 103 While passively referencing he filed a motion for 
reconsideration which the District Court denied, Rekow fails to provide any argument or 
authority on this point. Further, Rekow has failed to provide any authority for his position that 
the District Court erred in limiting his damages. Based on Rekow's claims and his general 
inability to provide coherent argument or authority, his appeal can only be interpreted as a means 
to increase the costs oflitigation and to harass Weekes. 104 
102 McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425,283 P.3d 742, 749 (2012). 
103 Rekow' s initial notice of appeal included the motion for reconsideration as an issue on appeal. His first amended 
notice of appeal, however, did not include the issue. Moreover, Rekow did not seek to include his motion for 
reconsideration or the District Court's order thereon as part of the record on appeal, thereby leaving this Court 
without any means of reviewing the issue. As this Court has previously held, "Our law is plain that error must be 
shown on the record and ... the appellant has the burden of providing a sufficient record on appeal." Garcia v. 
Pinkham, 144 Idaho 898, 900, 174 P.3d 868, 870 (2007). 
104 See McLean, supra, 283 P.3d at 749. 
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Similarly, Weekes is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l .2(a), 
which provides in part, "The signature of [a] ... party constitutes a certificate ... that to the best of 
the signer's knowledge, infonnation, and belief after reasonable inquiry [the appeal] is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."105 
This Court has held that when determining what sanction is appropriate under the rule, "a lack of 
legal or factual grounds, alone is generally not enough to support an award of attorney fees 
without a showing that the appeal was brought for an improper purpose." 106 An improper 
purpose may be inferred, particularly where the lower court repeatedly explains the lawsuits 
failings. 107 Further, this Court has awarded attorney fees under the rule where the appellant 
failed to provide a complete record on appeal and merely asked the Court to by-pass well-
established rules. 108 
Here, the only conclusion that can be reached is that Rekow pursued the appeal for the 
sole purpose of increasing the costs of litigation to Weekes and unnecessarily delaying a 
conclusion to this litigation. Throughout the various legal proceedings between Rekow and 
Weekes, Rekow has repeatedly sought to raise issues untimely and then cry foul when such 
untimely issues were not considered. 109 Rekow conceded many facts at the summary judgment 
105 I.AR. l l.2(a). 
106 Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337,339, 160 P.3d 1272, 1274 (2007). 
101 Id. 
108 Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 147 Idaho 56, 59, 205 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009) (awarding 
attorney fees as a sanction against appellant's attorneys where the appeal was untimely filed, the appellant failed to 
provide the court with a complete record on appeal and asked the court to by-pass well-established rules of civil and 
appellate procedure). 
109 For example, at the unlawful detainer hearing, Judge Smith asked Rekow to produce any records showing he had 
provided written notice of defects prior to September 14, 2012, and Rekow could not produce any. R. Vol. 1, p. 49 
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hearing which led to the District Court's decisions determining that his claim for conversion was 
moot, as was any claim to specific performance for repairs to the house, in light of the fact that 
Rekow no longer lived there and the house had been tom down. While Rekow apparently seeks 
to challenge the District Court's decision denying his motion for reconsideration, he failed to 
include the motion or the order denying the motion in the record on appeal. Rekow fails to 
provide any legal authority supporting his challenge to the District Court's decision and 
otherwise asks this Court to merely second guess the reasoned decision of the District Court. In 
short, Rekow's appeal is not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law, and the only 
inference that can be made is that the appeal is designed merely to prolong and increase the costs 




Weekes requests that this Court affirm the District Court's order limiting Rekow's 
damages to the period after he submitted his three-day notice to repair defects. Weekes further 
requests that this Court find that Rekow has waived issues relating to his claims for specific 
performance, breach of the implied warranty of habitability and conversion, either because they 
were untimely raised on appeal or because Rekow fails to support these issues with any citations 
to the record and legal authority in support. Alternatively, the District Court properly dismissed 
those claims. Weekes further requests that the Court award him his reasonable costs and 
(unlawful detainer transcript p. 4, L 23 - p. 5, L 22). When Rekow tried to raise issues relating to a wage claim in 
the unlawful detainer hearing, Judge Smith explained that Rekow had waived such a claim by failing to timely file a 
notice of a claim. Id. at p. 6, LL 12-15 and p. 24, LL 13. Similarly, Judge Wiebe, at the summary judgment 
hearing, had to remind Rekow that he could not submit new information relating to his argument at the summary 
judgment hearing and that other claims sought to be introduced by way of a motion to amend were not properly 
before the court. Tr. p. 14, LL 12-17 and p.15, LL 2-18. 
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attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§6-324 and 12-121, and 
Idaho Appellate Rules 11.2( a), 40 and 41. 
Dated this 13th day of March, 2015. 
*** 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
olinka 
Attorney for the Ronald Weekes 
Defendant/Respondent 
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